Supplementary analysis

Punishment of the excluders in the Dictator Game: time effects
To investigate whether punishment frequency progressively declined during the Dictator Game, we tested whether punishment frequency was lower in the second and third run of the experiment (each run lasted 7.7 minutes). First, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed with 'Inequality condition' (5 levels: beneficial inequality, non-costly mild inequality, noncostly severe inequality, costly inequality and prosocial inequality), 'Recipient' (2 levels: Costly Inequality for the excluders was chosen more in the first run (37%) compared to the second (18%; p < .05 ) and third run (17%, p < .05), in which costly inequality was chosen at similar rates (p = 1). There was no significant main effect of 'Run' in the Beneficial Inequality (p = .766), Mild non-costly Inequality mild (p = .054), Severe non-costly Inequality (p = .057) and Prosocial Inequality (p =.506) conditions (see supplementary figure   1 ). Together, these results show that punishment is executed less during the later stages of the experiments when participants have to give up money to punish the excluders. 
